Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: Directing Law to Serve Human Needs

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INTRODUCTION

In U.S. constitutional law, the state action doctrine — attaching the protections of individual rights to government action — is notoriously confusing, if not incoherent. Though the doctrine is already known for its “lack of clarity,”1 commentors compete in rhetorical flourishes, describing the doctrine “a collection of arbitrary rules,”2 “a conceptual disaster area,”3 and, my personal favorite, “a torchless search for a way out of a damp echo-

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Yet, satisfying the “state action” requirement is a precondition for judicial enforcement of individual rights. This very fact is sadly a key reason for the doctrine’s incoherence. It is the threshold question—the door—into the room of rights; all the pressures and desires to apply and to resist rights tear it from its hinges. Thus, while the basic inquiry over whether the challenged action took place under the auspices of government seems intuitive, the case law over time has created a patchwork quilt of tests and precedents defining who counts as a government actor, when nongovernmental actors may nonetheless be treated as acting with governmental authority, and when a given action involves sufficient indications of governmental authority to give rise to the constitutional limitations that ensure accountability for public values.

Attention to the doctrine comes and goes. It now warrants renewed attention for at least three reasons: (i) the sharp increases in privatization due to governmental outsourcing to private actors; (ii) efforts by businesses to insulate themselves from judicial action and from the application of civil rights laws; and (iii) the growing reliance of all aspects of society on privately-built infrastructure, related to the Internet and digital revolution. These challenges reflect tensions between public values and the value of a private sphere; show disagreements about the dividing line between public and private spheres; and implicate constitutional values such as due process, equal protection, and freedom of speech even if federal judicial treatment is not availing. Constitutional values inform efforts by the political branches, state or municipal government action, and private initiatives. When the legal doctrine renders the values remote and unpredictable, there is a problem that deserves not only judicial treatment, but broader public concern.

Reformulations could make the state action doctrine more sensible for federal judicial action and other legal and collective responses. The aim of this Article is less to advocate for any particular reformulation than to emphasize how the current chaos itself alters the shape of fundamental rights in lived experience. Constitutional values in this sense are not only materials for federal adjudication, but also the material shaping the debates and aspirations of Americans about how we want to be treated and how we want power held accountable. Other legal resources beyond federal courts could remedy the problem as well. The law should not prevent the public from articulating and realizing collective responsibility for constitutional values when trends recast matters of public concern as “private.”

What follows are discussions of the mess that is the state action doctrine (Section I), the rise of new issues elevating the importance of the line between governmental and nongovernmental activities in large swaths of

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4 Id.
5 See infra Section I.
6 For a good recent survey of past and present discussions, see generally Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1248 (2010) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
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daily life (Section II), and the connections and disconnections between the governmental-nongovernmental distinction and what society treats as public versus private (Section III). After these foundational discussions, this Article maps potential alternative formulations of the state action doctrine (Section IV) and additional avenues for change that would advance the goal of accountability to the community that underlies the state action doctrine (Section V).

I. WHY THE DOCTRINE IS A MESS

I have already reported the frequent assessments that the current state action doctrine is notoriously incoherent. Only those acting pursuant to statutes and regulations, government employees, and a narrow set of other actors can enter the state-action doorway and trigger protections of due process under the 5th and 14th Amendments. Behind this doorway exist guarantees of fair hearings, equal protection, and life, liberty, and property.7 And through the incorporation doctrine, protections of free speech and free exercise of religion are included; however, these protections only arise when a state actor jeopardizes the right. This doctrinal limitation is true even if behavior by a telephone company, credit card agency, Internet service provider, private school, private police, or private prison are awfully constraining and powerful.

Historical analysis does not resolve the confusion but may offer at least some explanation for it.9 By finding that Congress lacked power to enact the

7 Federal constitutional norms may enter through means other than federal judicial action. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.1 (Am. Law Inst. 2001) provides that, “[s]ervitudes that are invalid because they violate public policy include, but are not limited to: . . . [those] that unreasonably burden[ ] a fundamental constitutional right.” States enact such a rule through their judicial decisions.


Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme Court set the problem in motion. The Court allowed local and state law to regulate discriminatory conduct in public accommodations, entertainment, and transportation when run by non-governmental actors. The Court’s concern for federalism dominated; it presumed that state law would ensure that innkeepers and public carriers would furnish accommodation and service to “all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.” The federal government could intervene only if state laws themselves imposed unjust discrimination. Yet, the Court also hinted that the constitutional responses to slavery stop short of federal regulation of choices by individuals about whom to transport or whom to drive.

The states failed to guard against racial discrimination in public accommodations, employment, and other activities and countenanced vigilante violence against African-Americans. Propelled by the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, Congress responded with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and dodged the limitations of the 1883 *Civil Rights Cases* by resting the new federal concern in the Commerce Clause rather than the 14th Amendment. Courts expanded the doctrine during the Civil Rights era in the face of inventive and strained efforts by governments to privatize schooling and bypass public housing standards. Hence, state action could be found where the private actor performed a public function or where the privatization rolled back previously available protections. The Court even introduced a notion that entanglement between public and private actors could amount to discriminatory conduct when a customer was denied service based on his race by a private restaurant located in a publicly-funded and state-owned building.

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11 *Id.* at 25.

12 *Id.*

13 *Id.*


16 See *Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty.*, 377 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1964) (finding state action and denial of equal protection when the County School Board closed public schools while replacing them with and contributing to private segregated white schools); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380–81 (1967) (finding unconstitutional an article of the California Constitution preventing any person from using his discretion to decline to sell, lease, or rent his real property to another because it would involve the state in private racial discrimination to an unconstitutional degree).

17 See *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.*, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (finding that lessees of publicly-funded buildings must comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).
This expansive view stopped short of encompassing racial discrimination by a private club operating under a public liquor license and the termination of electricity by a utility sanctioned by the state as a monopoly provider. Shifts in the country’s politics — including backlash against the Civil Rights Movement and Supreme Court appointments after 1970 — better explain alterations in the state action doctrine than internal doctrinal analyses. Contrast the high water mark of expansive state action and the current day. In *Shelley v. Kraemer*, the Court found state action for judicial rejection of racially restrictive covenants governing private property because the property owner ultimately relied upon judicial enforcement to secure the purposes of the covenants. Yet forty years later, the Court found no state action when a father severely beat and disabled his child after social services failed to remove the child from his father’s custody even after being notified of possible abuse.

Thus, even though the nineteenth century *Civil Rights Cases* undid the federal effort to implement the 14th Amendment’s antidiscrimination norms in businesses, contracts, public accommodations, and civil society, the twentieth century civil rights decisions expanded federal enforcement of civil rights norms. And in recent decades, the Supreme Court has declined to expand or even reiterate prior rulings while keeping old precedents in place. The result is a set of decisions bound by their facts, not by their analyses. For instance, the Supreme Court found no state action in the conduct of a private school funded nearly exclusively from government sources, but did find state action in a private association of interscholastic athletic competitions including both public and private schools. The Court rejected a claim of state action when a state statute authorized a private warehouse to sell someone’s goods as a remedy for an unpaid debt, and yet found state action four years later when another creditor was able to attach a
debtor’s property using a writ of attachment issued by a state court clerk and executed by the county sheriff.  

The Court finds state action at times when public and private actors visibly join together — as they did in an interscholastic athletics association and in seizure of goods by a private creditor — but not when the private actor is empowered by public law to act coercively — i.e., to seize a debtor’s goods or to violently beat a child. Perhaps judicial concerns about a limitless state arise when a finding of state action would lead to greater state supervision, liability, or engagement with private actors. Indeed, limitations on state action embody judicial concerns about private actors’ freedom and reflect particular conceptions about the roles of state and federal governments, courts and legislatures, and economic markets. Yet the pattern of precedents does not establish coherent protections for liberty nor consistent restrictions on governmental power.

The confusion multiplies in legal questions related, but not identical, to the constitutional state action doctrine. Two connected questions ask who is acting “under color of state law” and who has full or partial immunities accorded to state actors sued for violations of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similar questions arise under the analogous judge-made doctrine that enables suits against federal actors for violations of law. Consider how a private physician under contract to treat individuals in a state prison acted under color of state law, but when state police conducted an illegal raid and arrest, the police department was not held responsible for the officers’ conduct when they were sued in their “personal-capacity.” This contrast indicates how the muddled doctrine allows outsourced governmental work to bypass constitutional restrictions and other public obligations, such as dis-
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closure under the Freedom of Information Act. Such inconsistency renders unclear restrictions against privatizing “inherently governmental functions.” Further complications arise as private actors — running shopping malls, Internet services, and other nongovernmental efforts — are replacing public squares and towns as the modern spaces where people interact, express themselves, and connect with others.

Resurging concerns about federalism echo the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. In contemporary contexts that bring greater intermixing of state and federal action and public and private activities, federal judges may find it best to leave regulation to the states or to Congress. For example, after initially protecting freedom of speech at private shopping malls, the Supreme Court has reversed course as a matter of federal law. However, some states have continued to protect speech at shopping malls under their state constitutions. Will the federal analysis extend to virtual shopping malls and other spaces on the Internet? Could statutes provide more consistency and reach private activities substituting for public settings? Congress can and does extend some constitutional norms — such as antidiscrimination and free speech protections — to private actors as conditions on federal spending or

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35 In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment barred delegation of power to the private shopping malls to restrict speech through use of trespass law. Hudgens v. Nation Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976), reversed this decision while leaving in place the protection of speech in a company town. State courts in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have protected speech in shopping malls under their state constitutions. See James Barger, Extending Speech Rights Into Virtual Worlds, 7 SCI TECH LAW, 18, 18–22 (July 2010); Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 1303–14.

36 See James Barger, supra note 35.
as regulations of interstate commerce. However, these concessions do little to properly address the growing need to define clearly the state action doctrine in a way that accords with modern difficulties.

II. NEW URGENCY

Concerned with the power of monopolies and big business and worried about passive consumerism, Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote that, “the law has everywhere a tendency to lag behind the facts of life.” This remains true even now. Brandeis planned, according to historian Steven Piott, to “chip away at the assumption that the principles of law should be unchanging” and “break the traditional hold on legal thinking [by] work[ing] to harmonize the law with the needs of the community.” In the same spirit, this Article suggests that the facts of contemporary life are changing in ways that the law should acknowledge.

Yet instead of reflecting contemporary life, the state action doctrine breeds confusion and incoherence. Some may argue that doctrinal confusion acts as a resource for litigators and reformers. Reformers can draw from the inconsistent strands of case law in advancing their arguments. But a doctrinal mess impairs understanding and realization of purposes; it also obscures the issues and makes them less accessible for public debate. Three modern developments make the current mess of the state action doctrine even more significant: first is the expansion of private actors performing functions or actions formerly performed by state actors; second is the increased insertion of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts; and third is the increased use of Internet and digital communication by consumers and businesses.

A. Increased Privatization of Traditionally Public Services

In my other work, I have explored the United States government’s heavy reliance on private contractors who served in paramilitary units with the Central Intelligence Agency. These private contractors gathered intelligence, maintained combat equipment, provided logistical support, and worked on surveillance and targeting during the recent conflicts in Afghani-

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39 STEVEN L. PIOTT, AMERICAN REFORMERS, 1870–1920: PROGRESSIVES IN WORD AND DEED 127, 128 (2006); see also Jeffrey Rosen, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 15 (2016) (“[Brandeis] insisted that ‘the living law’ had to adapt to social change and attempted to translate the values of the framers of the Constitution into an age of technologies and mass-production methods they could not have imagined.”).
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Gillian Metzger was one of the first to emphasize the inadequacy of the state action doctrine in the face of increasing governmental reliance on private entities. Edward Rubin calls privatization one of the two trends defining administrative law over the past several decades. Private military contractors, prisons, police, and disaster-relief organizations take up government work through contracts, vouchers, and other funding mechanisms. Governments rely on private actors to provide information technology, management, social services, and even oversight of outsourcing. At the same time, private individuals notably rely on for-profit and non-profit organizations for schooling, dispute resolution, and safety and security.

Challenges to public values increase when businesses claim proprietary information and use other legal arguments to avoid public duties. Ironically, in a different development, some businesses have sought constitutional shields to be exempt from civil rights laws and other legal claims; here, private actors turn to the Constitution to avoid compliance with public legal duties. Further limitations on public values come when businesses use

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41 Minow, Outsourcing Power, supra note 33, at 112–17. See also Laura Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in Government by Contract, supra note 33, at 335, 336–51 (noting similar issues and the silence in the contracts about training for private contractors in human rights law).

42 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1421 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in Government by Contract, supra note 33, at 291.


44 Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in Government by Contract, supra note 33, at 1–13. In light of an Inspector General report that private prisons have higher rates of assaults and other violations, the U.S. Department of Justice is ending its use of private facilities. Matt Zapotosky and Chico Harlan, Justice Department Says It Will End Use of Private Prisons, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/08/18/justice-department-says-it-will-end-use-of-private-prisons/?utm_term=.32c57299bdc7, archived at https://perma.cc/KB5M-78L5. This decision by itself does not affect the use of private providers in immigration and detention facilities, in state jails and prisons, and in probation, parole, and other aspects of corrections, although future reforms may emerge.


46 Claiming exemptions due to First Amendment rights issues is well beyond the state action doctrine. But as public functions are performed by private sectors, First Amendment claims raise further jeopardy to public accountability. The increasing clashes between LGBT rights of equality and privacy on the one hand and free exercise of religion on the other is exemplary. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014), the Supreme Court held that a closely-held for-profit company could be exempt from the federal regulation under the Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), requiring employers to cover certain forms of contraception in health insurance offered to employees, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). The Court rejected the federal regulation as failing to accord the least restrictive alternative for a company run by owners with religious objections, id., as required by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1993). The decision raises the specter of private businesses claiming religious exemptions for a variety of federal laws. See Adam Liptak,
contract terms limiting access to courts to enforce rights. While these developments may not implicate the state action doctrine directly, they sharply curtail the ability of individuals to pursue or exercise constitutional rights.47

B. Increased Commercial Use of Arbitration Clauses

Consider the increasingly common business practice of including contract terms that require individuals to submit any complaints to arbitration.48 Credit card companies, for example, require customers to agree to arbitrate any disputes, and thereby prevent class actions.49 This mechanism means

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47 Phillips, supra note 9, at 727.


that individuals are considerably less capable of asserting consumer and tort claims, as they can seldom cover the litigation expenses without the aggregation effects of class actions. Additionally, employers, Internet providers, cell phone carriers, rental car agencies, and nursing homes have privatized dispute resolution through contracts, thereby curtailing access to court, which in the past had been protected as a 14th Amendment right of due process.

Unfortunately, this arguably unconstitutional practice seems here to stay. Supreme Court advocate Paul Clement has observed that there is only one question about the repeated challenges to arbitration clauses coming up to the United States Supreme Court: will the challengers lose by a 5-to-4 vote or lose 9-0?50 The Court recently upheld a contractual clause requiring arbitration of all claims brought against American Express and prohibiting merchants from bringing any class action claims — even if the effect is to prevent the vindication of contract claims.51 Justice Elena Kagan wrote in dissent, “[t]he monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.”52

Businesses can not only use the private ordering tools of contract to avoid public obligations; but they can also assert exemptions from otherwise applicable laws, curtailing the ability of individuals to enforce constitutional rights.53 As some businesses successfully assert religious freedom as grounds for avoiding public duties, others claim freedom of speech to avoid regulation and increasingly threaten to insulate corporate behavior from public accountability.54 There is a possible solution, however. In earlier decades, the state action doctrine included a strand identifying “public functions,” and applied constitutional requirements to private actors performing essentially governmental functions.55 This concept has received less


52 Id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 Brook. L.Rev. 111, 131, 134 (2015).
judicial approval in recent years. Perhaps a broad view of public function would extend to private arbitration. The instances of private arbitration and businesses denying access to insurance coverage for employees electing contraceptives could be covered under the widest interpretation of state action — finding it present when the government is entangled with private conduct, when a private actor’s scope of authority is itself crafted by law, or when its enforcement would depend upon judicial action. A similar conclusion would come under a view advanced by Cass Sunstein — that state action is always present because the law recognizes and enforces the private laws of contract and property.

C. Increased Use of the Internet and Digital Communications

Another huge shift making the state action question newly critical comes with the Internet and digital communications. Individuals, families, schools, businesses, governments, and other sectors have quickly become dependent on digital resources for communicating, storing and retrieving information, assessing conduct and performance, and even resolving disputes. This innovation presents the question: when should notions of freedom of speech, protections of individual privacy, and equal protection apply? Furthermore, should they apply by law or by contractual and self-governing efforts by tech companies and those using them?

60 Dispute resolution systems can combine artificial intelligence, game theory, digital communications, and auctions, sometimes producing resolutions without the involvement of a human adjudicator or mediator in the individual case. See Arno Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE 61–82 (Mohamed Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh & Daniel Rainey, eds., 2012). Ebay and Paypal have online dispute resolution. Rich Stim, Resolving eBay Disputes, NOLo (last visited Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/resolving-ebay-disputes-29970.html, archived at https://perma.cc/SX6F-M2T3. Ebay and Paypal’s on-line dispute resolution mechanism has generated concerns by both buyers and sellers even though it registers fairly high levels of satisfaction. See Anna Tims, If eBay’s Customers Are Always Right, Who’ll Protect Its Sellers?, THE GUARDIAN (July 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian
searches of employee email may or may not violate statutory law; but the statutes may themselves have little connection with employee expectations founded in constitutional norms. Facebook’s experiments with mood manipulation raised objections in terms of privacy and personal autonomy as well as concerns that Facebook, not users, have power and control. Whether the questions implicate freedom of speech, privacy, equal protection, or fairness, the nongovernmental status of the Internet, service providers, search engines, and related entities will make it difficult, if not impossible, to find state action despite people’s hopes and claims.

III. CURRENT TRENDS COMPLICATE UNDERSTANDINGS OF WHAT IS PUBLIC AND WHAT IS PRIVATE

Each of the trends described in the previous section has raised numerous unanswered, but important, questions about how to operate legally within the public and private spheres. Should due process attach to on-line dispute resolution? Should private military contractors be liable for violating constitutional and Military Code of Justice guarantees? Should private prisons be bound by constitutional restrictions? Should Internet providers be bound by freedom of speech and antidiscrimination norms? Should corporations be able to prevent employees and customers from raising legal claims against them in court? There are no natural or universal answers to these
questions, especially because it has become difficult to distinguish what is public from what is private. Attempts to make such distinctions ultimately depend on and reflect choices made by a society at a particular place and time.

The very notion that a private sphere is different from a public sphere varies across cultures and shifts over time. We in the United States for at least several decades have associated the two spheres with distinct characteristics. For public spaces, we value transparency, equality, and adherence to clear processes. For private spaces, we emphasize autonomy of decision-making by owners, efficiency, intimacy, and seclusion. Converting everything into the public sphere jeopardizes values of independence, variety and ease, and risks greater costs, standardization, and bureaucratization. Converting everything into the private sphere threatens personal freedoms to associate, to enjoy transparency, and to pursue innovations tested by economic and social marketplaces.

Yet this statement of the tensions, pinpointed to our moment in time and geography, makes the distinction between public and private seem all too easy. Even restricting our focus to 2016 in the United States, the distinction between “public” and “private” regularly means two very different ideas. The first distinguishes all that is governmental from all that is not; the second distinguishes the home, family, and intimate relations from all that is not. Sliding between these definitions of public and private is the space between home and government that includes all that is commercial or contractual, and now, the Internet as well. We call some zones within this space “public accommodations” even though the hotels, restaurants and buses so identified are privately owned and the clubs and associations are organized by private groups. We treat the Internet as nongovernmental even though some countries do not, and even though in the United States, the U.S. Department of Commerce plays a role. In addition, some civic activities can fall within this murky terrain. For example, some civic organizations are so large and inclusive that they become so infused with public significance that the Supreme Court has decided that they should not be allowed to discriminate on the basis of gender.

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when they control election procedures — and at other times seem private — as when they pursue ideas, assembly, and competition for adherents.68

There are multiple possibilities for drawing distinctions between what is public and what is private, but the focus on any place to draw the distinction does not frankly reveal the choices about what values should prevail in different parts of human experiences. For example, consider whether a space that was traditionally free from public regulation should now be subject to a public requirement, such as a ban against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. A basic problem is treating this issue as though the distinction between what is public and what is private is something that can be found in nature or discerned objectively. On the contrary, clarifying when constitutional rights are implicated necessarily involves choices, not discovery of facts of nature. When courts decline to engage in this difficult undertaking, that decision reflects a choice about when public values apply just as much as it does when courts do accept the challenge and assert public values. In such cases, judicial inaction rings just as loudly as judicial action.

Neither a definition of state action nor a distinction between what is public and what is private can easily resolve ongoing questions about what values should apply and what accountability measures deserve enforcement. However, in light of new trends like the rise of the Internet and the expansion of mandatory arbitration, this question must be answered. Whether framed in terms of the state action doctrine applied by courts, or determined as a matter of public policy through legislation and community action, promising reforms should identify potential alternative ways to demarcate what should be treated as public and what should be treated as private.

IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

Given that the two different meanings of public and private are affecting and, in turn, shaped by the legal characterization of state action, American law tries to respect several competing values. We want to enforce constitutional restrictions on governmental action, but we also want to protect the autonomy and self-determination of individuals, businesses, and non-profit organizations, including religious organizations. We want accountability, but we do not want excessive burdens on either public bureaucracies or private conduct. Given these multiple goals, consider seven basic alternatives to the existing muddle of the state action doctrine:

1) Read state action very broadly to include private conduct backed by law, and interpret private law in light of constitutional norms;\(^9\)
2) Decide matters on a case-by-case basis by balancing competing public and private interests;\(^{10}\)
3) Rely on government officials to define through contracts, statutes, and regulations the extent to which individuals and private organizations must observe constitutional norms;\(^{11}\)
4) Find state action where the state has lent its coercive powers to a private party and enabled an injury only because the state did so;\(^{12}\)
5) Define and bolster a doctrine of privacy to protect interests that otherwise would be jeopardized by expansive views of state action;
6) Define state action very narrowly to refer solely to conduct of state employees and officials;
7) Define immunities for state actors if their actions do not violate clearly established law.

These alternatives are arrayed roughly on a spectrum. On one end is an option extending federal constitutional guarantees broadly; on the other end is an option narrowing the scope of such guarantees. Neither extreme nor an in-between option is perfect, but each is better than the current muddle. Either extreme would steer judicial application to greater predictability and expose the crucial question behind debates over state action: when and how should powerful actors be held accountable? Ultimately, these alternatives point in many instances to methods of accountability beyond the work of the judiciary. Here is a sketch of the arguments for and against each of these options:

1) Read state action very broadly to include private conduct backed by law even if role of state officials is indirect or remote. This option would extend guarantees of due process, speech, and other constitutional rights to govern both relations between the government and private actors, and relations between private actors who have authority behind their actions, or use government enforcement to resolve their disputes. This revives *Shelley v. Kraemer*. This view is also advanced by the dissenters in


\(^12\) See Chiang, supra note 1, at 651–52. Chiang also proposes as an element for finding state action an affirmative answer to whether the private actor is “cloaked in the authority of the state.” *Id.* at 696–97.
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services Department,73 where the state is held liable for returning the child to the care of his father when state social workers knew the child was in grave danger. Mark Tushnet and others call this “horizontal application” of constitutional norms74 applying between private individuals, as opposed to vertical application, which is between individuals and the government. This alternative has been adopted in Ireland, Canada, Germany, South Africa, and the European Union.

In favor: This alternative relieves reliance on the definition of state action and shifts analysis instead to the scope of a given right. It is an alternative pursued in many other constitutional democracies, which suggests it is workable, and it treats constitutional values as germane to conduct throughout society.

In opposition: This alternative subjects many activities currently excluded from government supervision to judicial challenge with attendant economic costs and restrictions on discretion, privacy, and experimentation.

In favor: This alternative makes judicial decisions about the scope of constitutional norms explicit and frames them in terms of normative values rather than discernment of a public/private line.

In opposition: This alternative subjects more domains of life and human interaction to judicial decision-making without clear guideposts for decisions, permits discretion based on the views of individual judges, and risks jeopardizing respect for the judiciary if the decisions are viewed as controversial or politicized. Courts may lack capacities to know or understand the prospective economic and social costs of their decisions.

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2) Courts should decide matters on a case-by-case basis by balancing competing public and private interests. For example, what kind of due process is appropriate when a private utility terminates a customer’s service should reflect the relative weights of the competing interests at stake.75

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3) Rely on government officials to define through contracts, statutes, and regulations the extent to which individuals and private organizations must observe constitutional norms. For example, contracts with private prison companies can specify as require-

74 See Tushnet, supra note 69.
75 Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 552 (pointing to Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
ments adherence to due process and protections against cruel and unusual punishment; these conditions on the expenditure of public funds are then transparent and also subject to the choice of voters. Similarly, a state legislature may prohibit through a public accommodation law discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and/or sexual orientation in a private club. Establishing this norm through a statute would be transparent and open to democratic debate and accountability.76

In favor: Contracts allow parties to specify terms, and when the government is a party, it can craft terms to implement public values to which the government itself is bound by and committed. Private ordering by contract allows the parties to adapt terms, to monitor compliance, and to use financial incentives and the power to terminate or renew the contract in order to promote enforcement.

In opposition: Experience to date suggests that the failure of government agencies to supply and enforce contractual terms reflects lack of capacity, resources, and will to use contractual terms for public accountability. Hence, there is significant likelihood that serious monitoring efforts would themselves require outsourcing to private contractors — with the same problems of insufficient capacity and resources — that will lead back to the initial issue of private enforcement.

4) Find state action where the state has lent its coercive powers to a private party and enabled an injury only because the state did so. For example, students subject to compulsory schooling who are assigned without choice to an alternative school run by a private for-profit company should be able to assert enforceable protections against discipline imposed without due process and unreasonable searches conducted without protections of students’ privacy.77

In favor: This approach prevents governments from substituting a privately-organized actor to perform what is otherwise a public or government activity in order to avoid the accountability and restrictions attached to a government actor; this approach, as a result, makes the use of the private organization turn on factors other than avoidance of public duties.

In opposition: This alternative limits innovation, competition, and potential cost-savings by forcing private entities to follow precisely the same strictures attached to public ones.

76 See generally Huhn, supra note 2.
77 See Chiang, supra note 1, at 651–52.
5) Courts and/or legislatures should define and bolster a doctrine of privacy to protect interests that otherwise would be jeopardized by expansive views of state action. Concerns about invasion of rights of private association and individual autonomy would be addressed by affirmative protections for private clubs to discriminate.

In favor: This alternative identifies the independent value of privacy, which means ensuring individuals and groups have control over their own information, autonomous choices, and latitude to diverge from state-enforced conformity as significant and worthy of government protection. This alternative shifts focus and debate away from the state action muddle and instead to the desirable scope of privacy protections.

In opposition: Privacy, some think, is less important than equality and uniform protection of rights. “Privacy” also lends itself to its own debates and ambiguities.

6) Define state action very narrowly to refer solely to conduct of state employees and officials. Accordingly, private contractors and other private actors would not be subject to federal constitutional requirements, although the conduct of private actors would be subject to the terms of government contracts or otherwise prevailing state or federal statutory or common law.

In favor: This option embraces formalist definitions and the efficiency and clarity that accompany them. It also confines public restrictions to the behavior of individuals who have accepted the application of those restrictions by choosing their roles as government officials.

In opposition: This option invites avoidance of public duties through arrangements that shift activities to individuals or groups identified as nongovernmental even when they deploy governmental resources and authority or perform functions identical to those undertaken by government.

7) Define immunities for state actors if their actions do not violate clearly established law. Here, even actions by state employees and officials would not give rise to liability under federal law if the individuals involved are performing discretionary functions and where their actions, even if later found to be unlawful, did not violate “clearly established law.”

78 New problems arise with this approach. Larry Alexander and Paul Horton explain that the category of “government officials” is unprincipled and represents an ad hoc and unstable compromise. See Larry Alexander & Paul Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command?: A Conceptual Analysis with Practical Implications, 89–90 (1988).

In favor: This option acknowledges that the techniques of correctional justice — involving litigation and risk of damages or injunctive relief — are costly and sometimes ill-suited to the complexities of providing governmental services. This option could even extend to private actors, performing functions that would be shielded from accountability under government immunities if undertaken by government officials.

In opposition: This option removes accountability tools even in some contexts, such as prisons and schooling, when alternative accountability tools — offered by market competition or consumer choice — are often unavailable or ineffective.

The contrast among these alternatives can help to clarify the trade-offs at stake. Defining state action expansively triggers the broad application of constitutional norms. A narrow definition of state action permits more scope for racial and gender discrimination, more constraints on speech, and more abuses of power. What these diverse alternatives share is specificity. Selecting any of these options would steer judicial application to greater predictability. Each exposes the crucial question behind debates over state action: When and how should powerful actors be held accountable? The alternatives point in many instances to a consideration of accountability broader than the work of the judiciary, and hence it is to other avenues for accountability that this Article now turns.

V. WHAT IS REALLY AT STAKE: INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY

The state action doctrine, and the distinction between what should be viewed as public and what as private, embed normative choices inside definitions without clarifying what is at stake for society. Courts consider questions in terms of state action or what is public versus private rather than questions such as: Should governments avoid constitutional restrictions by outsourcing their work to private contractors? Should businesses be able to use contract law to shield their activities from the due process requirements otherwise available to enforce employee and consumer rights, or exempt themselves from public norms by asserting religious and speech rights? How much should society constrain person and group privacy and freedom in combating discrimination and insistent processes? Should the expansion of so much commercial, social, and expressive activity to the Internet displace the protections of due process, privacy, speech, and equality that would apply in comparable face-to-face interactions? Older more expansive readings of state action could be revived (if judges agree), but decisions couched in terms of the scope of state action do not address the underlying questions of what values should prevail where and how society best organize risks and benefits. No formulation of the meaning of “state action”
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can adequately resolve these questions or weigh the competing values represented by public norms and protection for private realms.

Accountability fundamentally underlies such questions: Who is responsible for conduct and what consequences should follow from misconduct? When should particular actions be subject to the deterrence that follows risks of sanctions for wrongdoing? It is a mistake to place all hopes for collective accountability in federal constitutional law, interpreted by courts. Rules governing justifiability of cases in federal courts limit what courts can enforce; the state action doctrine may serve a screening function to limit courts to what some think is their scope of competence. Other branches of the federal government, the states, and other actors have authority and responsibility also to realize constitutional values.\[80\] Private actors as well as public actors face accountability through law; the doctrines of tort, contract, and criminal law apply. Market mechanisms of competition for partners, consumers, and investors also govern private action. Other ways to pursue articulation and realization of values underlying the constitution include working through democratic institutions and other initiatives.\[81\] These include:

1) State constitutional law;
2) State statutory and common law;
3) Public contract with private actors;
4) Private contracts with contractors, employees, and consumers;
5) Voluntary codes of conduct;
6) Private competition;
7) Political protests, economic boycotts, and crowd-sourced ratings.

Thus, some state constitutions explicitly extend state constitutional guarantees to private action and some simply do not specifically confine the guarantees to governmental action.\[82\] Some states have interpreted their constitutions to protect freedom of speech in private shopping malls.\[83\] Similar approaches could extend to Internet speech and to other behavior as long as such interpretations would not contravene federal constitutional protections for religious exercise, association, or property. State statutory and common law can define what is a public accommodation and what duties commercial actors have to employees and consumers, again, subject to the limitations of the federal constitution.\[84\]

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\[81\] See BeVier & Harrison, supra note 28, at 1769 (treating such alternatives as subconstitutional).


\[83\] See Tarr, supra note 82, at 13.


Contract terms can incorporate the norms expressed in the federal constitution and apply them to private conduct. Thus, governments that outsource public functions can write into their contracts explicit terms that require compliance with norms established by the Constitution or that otherwise attach to government actors. These terms are missing from contracts either because of inattention or lack of bargaining power for those seeking them. Inattention could be tackled through political protests, economic boycotts, and crowd-sourced ratings of merchants and companies. These same tools could generate support for state-level law reforms and voluntary codes of conduct and perhaps shape consumer demand. Businesses could compete for customers and employees by supplying protections for speech, privacy, equal treatment, due process, equal protection, and other norms, but thus far such demand has not been sufficient.

CONCLUSION

Governments pay or subsidize private actors to supply prisons, law enforcement, elements of national security, and schooling; businesses try to avoid regulations and the enforcement of the rights of consumers and employees through contract terms and other maneuvers; and the Internet substitutes for so many public squares and people increasingly take their self-expression, purchasing, and activities of assembly and association to digital environments. Stemming from separate causes, these trends each push public values such as due process, equal protection, and freedom of speech out of reach for people conducting their daily lives. In the process, accountability recedes. So does public debate over the resulting shifts in the architecture of American society. The scope of public values shrinks as opportunities for discrimination and unfairness and erosions of privacy and trust grow. In earlier times, fights over the state action doctrine served as flash points for individuals and groups seeking constitutional attention to powerful actions. The doctrine has grown abstract, incoherent, and unavailing even as it stands in the way of explicit debate over the desirable scope of underlying values of fairness, privacy, equality, and speech. The state action doctrine actually could be redesigned to take one of many specific articulations on a spectrum of possibilities offering more or less application of constitutional values. Seeing and comparing concrete alternative formulations

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Dickinson, supra note 41, at 336; Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor Accountability, in Government by Contract, supra note 33, at 243.
of the doctrine can sharpen the trade-offs at stake. Even if no single formulation of the state action doctrine can produce a perfect resolution of the complex value choices it implicates, alternative formulations can assist public awareness and discussion of the departure from public commitments underway. Public awareness and discussion might well look beyond federal constitutional doctrine to state constitution, statutory, regulatory, and common law resources for accountability. Also available are terms for contracts involving public and private parties, voluntary codes of conduct, economic competition, political protests, boycotts, and crowd-sourced ratings. Perhaps with more efforts to articulate and debate explicitly what values should apply and what accountability mechanisms should be available in a world increasingly blurring public and private lines, we can help law catch up with how we actually live now.